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Mentoring, Educational Services, and Incentives to Learn: 
What Do We Know About Them?
* 
 
This paper reviews recent studies on the effectiveness of services and incentives offered to 
disadvantaged youth. We focus our analysis on three types of interventions: mentoring, 
educational services, and financial rewards. The objective of this article is threefold. First, we 
explain alternative theoretical points of view in favor (or against – when applicable) each of 
these interventions. Then, we discuss how recent empirical work has affected that view, and 
we summarize the latest findings. We conclude with a discussion on what questions remain 
to be examined. Our hope is that this article will serve as a resource for those seeking to 
understand what educational interventions work and for whom, and to use as a starting point 
to illuminate the debate on where to go next. 
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In response to the observed increasing earnings differential between the most and the least 
educated workers since the late 1970s, policies aiming at improving high-school graduation and 
post-secondary education enrollment have recently received renewed attention from policy 
makers, practitioners and researchers.  As a consequence, there has been a new wave of 
interventions whose main objective is to improve the school performance of disadvantaged 
youth.  Most of these interventions involve one or the combination of the following services: (i) 
a mentoring component; (ii) an educational component; and (iii) a financial incentive 
component.  Reviewing the theoretical motivation and the empirical evidence of these three 
interventions is the main focus of this paper. 
  The objective of this article is threefold.  First, we explain the alternative theoretical points 
of view in favor (or against—when applicable) each of these interventions.  Then, we discuss 
how recent empirical work has affected that view, and summarize the latest findings.  Finally, 
we conclude with a discussion on what questions remain to be examined.  The paper also 
presents the evidence on gender differential effects. 
  The paper focuses on recent studies that use either experimental design or quasi-
experimental design approaches, choosing to exclude those studies that do not provide a control 
group (or a rigorous comparison group).  To reduce the overlap with the extended literature on 
the effectiveness of interventions aimed at youth, we narrow most of the review to studies 
recently conducted—that is, within the last decade.  Three main findings arise.  First, rigorous 
evidence on mentoring programs finds positive but modest effects on the young people that 
participate in them, and that the most disadvantaged or at-risk seem to benefit the most from 
them.  However, there are concerns (and evidence) that these programs sometimes backfire.  
Second, studies on the effectiveness of educational services find that the earlier the intervention 




school or post-secondary education level work quite effectively for females when combined 
with financial incentives and mentoring.  Third, the evidence on financial rewards is mixed.  
While some studies find that they work in the short-run for certain subgroups, the difficulty in 
replicating those results suggests that the impact of incentives is context dependent. 
  A number of previous papers review the effectiveness of: (i) mentoring programs from the 
psychologist perspective (DuBois et al., 2002; Jekielek et al., 2002; Rhodes, 2008; Toland et al., 
2008);  (ii)  input-based schooling policies—such as lowering class sizes or tightening the 
requirement for teaching credentials—(Hanushek, 2003; and Rockoff, 2009); (iii) interventions 
on human capital skill formation (Heckman, 2000; and Cunha, et al., 2006); (iv) early childhood 
education programs (Heckman, 2000; Currie, 2001); (v) training and employment programs 
(Lalonde, 1995; Heckman et al., 1998; and Heckman, 2000); or (v)  financial incentives in 
laboratory experiments (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Bonner et al., 1996; Herwig and Ortmann, 
1998; and Jenkins et al., 1998).  Our hope is that this article will serve as a resource for those 
seeking to understand what educational interventions work and to use as a starting point to 
illuminate the debate on where to go next. 
 
II.  Mentoring  
A.  Theoretical Motivation 
Frequently, the problem with academic failure is not necessarily due to the students’ lack of 
cognitive skills, but instead due to (i) weak non-cognitive skills;
1 or (ii) personal, family, and 
social barriers that interfere with youth’s ability to attend school and do well there (Finn, 
1989).
2  From psychologists’ perspective, building strong positive relationships with extra 
familial adults (mentors) promotes resiliency among at-risk youth because mentoring 
                                                 
1 By non-cognitive skills I refer to self-esteem, motivation, tenacity, trustworthiness, and perseverance. 
2 Examples of personal, family or social barriers are being a teenage mother, not having a family car (or 





facilitates adolescents’ capacity to benefit from the support of parents and other providers, 
and influences positively the youths’ perceptions of self-worth and their beliefs about their 
competence as learners and their valuing of school (Rhodes et al., 2000).  Similarly, a 
willingness of adults (outside the family) to discipline youths, provide positive role models, 
and reduce the amounts of unsupervised youth activity are hypothesized to reduce crime 
(Wilson, 1987).  According to this view, the effects of mentoring ought to be stronger on 
younger youth and those more at-risk.  This is so because younger children are more 
malleable and receptive than older ones, implying that activities aiming to improve their 
social and emotional skills ought to have a greater impact the sooner they are imparted to the 
child and the improved environment (Heckman, 2000; Currie, 2001).  The mentoring view 
also expects greater gains among the most “at-risk” by virtue of individual or environmental 
circumstances because they are those for whom mentoring can make more of a difference in 
terms of emotional development (Rhodes, 1994; Hall, 2003).  Finally, when strong personal 
relationships are built, the long-term positive effects of these relationships ought to be long 
lasting since the benefits from socialization and the integration into mainstream society will 
foster further personal and emotional development. 
 
B.  Empirical Evidence 
Rigorous studies on the effectiveness of mentoring programs find that they have positive but 
modest effects on (some of) the young people that participate in them, and that the most 
disadvantaged or at-risk seem to benefit the most from them—see Dubois et al., 2002; 
Jekielek  et al., 2002; and Rhodes, 2008 for thorough reviews on the effectiveness of 
mentoring programs; and Grossman and Tierney, 1998, for a random assignment evaluation 
of one of the most well known mentoring program in the United States: Big Brother/Big 




found, they do not necessarily translate into higher academic performance.  For instance, a 
recent experimental evaluation of a school-based mentoring program (the Study of Mentoring 
in the Learning Environment (SMILE)) finds small, positive effects of mentoring on 
students’ connectedness to peers and on self-esteem and social skills, but not on academic 
outcomes (Karcher, 2008).   
Despite the large evaluation literature on effectiveness of youth mentoring 
programs—which includes reviews, program evaluations, and meta-analyses—, the bottom 
line is that not enough is known, or as Roberts et al., 2004 put it “robust research does 
indicate benefits from mentoring for some young people, in some circumstances, in relation 
to some outcomes.”  Moreover, Rhodes, 2008, calls for cautious optimism about the potential 
viability of mentoring interventions as results vary considerably depending on the 
characteristic of the individuals involved and the quality of the relationships they form.   
Indeed secondary analysis of both school- and community-based BBBS showed differential 
outcomes depending on the quality of the mentoring relationships with bigger benefits for 
those in stronger relationships, and neutral or even negative outcomes for those with less 
effective mentoring relationships (Herrera et al., 2007; and Grossman and Rhodes, 2002). 
According to DuBois et al., 2002, important elements leading to beneficial outcomes 
of mentoring programs include: (i) providing adequate support and structure for mentoring 
relations throughout the formative strategies of their development; (ii)  having relatively 
strong relationships between mentors and youths in terms of frequency of contact, emotional 
closeness, and longetivity; and (iii) targeting those youth considered most at-risk on the basis 
of environmental-level characteristics or both individual and environmental perspective,—but 
not those youth identified as being at risk solely on the basis of individual-level 
characteristics (such as, academic failure) since little benefits from mentoring have been 




Although DuBois et al.’s meta-analysis concludes that there is some limited evidence 
that benefits from mentoring extend beyond the end of the program participation, Rhodes, 
2008, warns that beneficial effects of mentoring programs (when found) erode to non-
significance within only a few months of program participation.  In particular, some recent 
studies corroborate Rhodes’ remark on the longetivity of the beneficial outcomes.  For 
instance, Herrera et al., 2007, find that the beneficial results from the school-based BBBS 
programs (such as, improved students’ academic performance, behavior in school, and school 
attendance) did not endure into the following school year.  Similarly, two experimental 
studies of the Across Ages mentoring program found that encouraging outcomes (such as, 
lower levels of student substance use and problem behaviors, and stronger attachment of 
students to school and their families) were not sustained beyond the end of the school year 
(Taylor, LoSciuto, Foz, and Sonkowsko, 1999; and Aseltine, et al., 2000). 
Another challenge in this literature is to understand the mechanisms through which 
mentoring works and affects academic outcomes.  Using the BBBS data, Rhodes et al., 2000, 
test whether the effects of mentoring on youths’ academic outcomes are mediated through 
improved parental relationships versus scholastic competence, school value, and self-worth.  
Their results validate the hypothesis that improved perceptions of parental relationships, 
although not the sole determinant, are important mediators of change in adolescents’ 
academic outcomes and behaviors.  These results are consistent with other findings on the 
relevance of parents’ involvement in early childhood interventions (Currie, 2001). 
 




C.  Alternative Explanations for Unanticipated Negative Effects of Mentoring 
Frequently, the purpose of mentors is to assess both the unmet needs of at-risk youths and the 
barriers they face and to facilitate access to a service mix that best addresses their needs and 
barriers.  However, it may well be that mentors end up overprotecting youths in such a way 
that they reduced their costs of engaging in risky behaviors (in particular, but not exclusively, 
criminal activity).  For instance, by acting as advocates of youths and negotiating on behalf of 
them with the high school, the criminal justice and other public agencies when youth get in 
trouble, mentors may mitigate the consequences of misbehaving.  And by doing so, they may 
have a perverse effect in that they prevent its mentorees from internalizing the full costs of 
engaging in such types of risky behaviors, leading to higher involvement in such type of 
activities in the future.  This view is consistent with Becker’s 1968 economic model of crime 
in which crime can be deterred through punishment, and with studies that have found that 
youths are responsive to sanctions (see for instance, Pacula et al., 2001; Chaloupka and 
Saffer, 1999; Levitt, 1998; and Levitt and Lochner, 2001, among others).   
Rodríguez-Planas, 2010, finds evidence supporting this hypothesis of deterrence (that is, a 
behavioral response of potential deviants to the incentives they face) using a randomized 
experiment of an intensive and comprehensive mentoring after-school program that lasted for 
five years—the four years of high-school plus one additional year in case youths fell behind a 
grade—, and that was targeted to at-risk youths in the United States: The Quantum 
Opportunity Program.  The author finds that, at the end of the intervention when youths were 
in their late-teens, program enrollees were significantly more likely to report having 
participated in a program that help them stay out of trouble and deal with police and the 




were in their mid-twenties, male enrollees were more likely to report committing a crime and 
being arrested or charged than males in the control group.
3   
This is not the only intervention to find no beneficial effects or unanticipated negative 
effects on participants.  The well-known randomized, experimental trial of the community-
based treatment program Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study, whose objective was to 
prevent delinquency, found that youths in the treatment group were more likely to be re-
arrested for crimes and have other negative impacts on physical and psychological health 
compared to youths in the control group in the long-run (McCord, 1978 and 1992).  The 
intervention was targeted to boys ages 5 to 13, and children in the treatment group received 
an individual counselor who visited the family around twice a month for five years and were 
referred to or received services in a variety of areas: tutoring, medical, psychiatric, summer 
camps, Boy Scouts, YMCA, or other community programs.   In contrast, children in the 
control condition did not receive any referrals or visits from a counselor.  The impacts were 
measured up to 30 years later using official state records.   
More recently, the experimental evaluation of the Student Mentoring Program, which was 
designed to fund grantees to enable them to provide mentoring to at-risk students in grades 4-
8, and whose ultimate goal of the program was to improve student academic and behavioral 
outcomes through the guidance and encouragement of a volunteer mentor, found that the 
program had no statistically significant impacts on any of the 17 outcomes measured, which 
covered academic achievement and engagement, interpersonal relationships and personal 
responsibility, and high-risk or delinquent behavior (Bernstein, et al., 2009).  Similarly, a 
                                                 
3 The results from this demonstration contrast with those from the evaluation of a pilot of the program 
conducted several years earlier (Hahn, 1999; Hahn et al., 1999).  While the results from the QOP pilot were 
slightly more promising than those from the large-scale evaluation demonstration discussed in this paper, they 
were measured at most several months after participants should have graduated from high-school, and therefore 
it is unclear whether these findings would have persisted over time as youth grew older.  Other important 
differences between the pilot and the demonstration included the sample size, which was smaller in the pilot, 
and the targeted population, which, in the pilot, were low-income students (as opposed to academically low-




different type of intervention that also aimed at improving non-cognitive skills, has also 
found discouraging results (Holmlund and Silva, 2009).  Although in this case, the authors 
present convincing evidence that unobservables may be biasing these results.  Using a quasi-
experimental design, the study evaluates the effects of a two-year intervention that targeted 
14 years old at-risk youths’ non-cognitive skills—such as, self-confidence, locus of control, 
self-esteem and motivation—with the aim of improving students’ records of attendance, test 
scores, and end-of-compulsory-education (age 16) cognitive outcomes.  The cross-sectional 
quasi-experimental estimates of the effect of the policy show a negative and significant 
impact on treated youths’ test scores at age 16, however, difference-in-differences and 
double-differences estimates suggest that negative selection into the program based on 
youth’s unobservables may be biasing these results.  
In addition to the hypothesis of deterrence, other explanations may also lead to mentoring 
programs having a perverse effect on youths’ outcomes.  For instance, it may well be that by 
offering a mentor, the program may weakened the ties between enrollees and their parents, 
breaking important social bonds.  An alternative and related explanation is that because 
enrollees’ parents trusted that another adult (the mentor) was also watching over their 
children, they ended up investing less time with their children and paying less attention to 
possible warning signs than parents of youths in the control group.  In essence, the program 
may have led to a substitution effect away from parents’ attention, which could have 
explained these detrimental findings.  Yet another hypothesis for the perverse results is that 
the program may have led its enrollees to be more aware of their relative disadvantaged 
situation in life, which may have brought upon them further  disappointment, leading them to 
engage in diverse types of risky behaviors.   
Another explanation for unexpected negative effects is that the anticipated positive effects 




training,” which occurs when peers reinforce deviant conduct by responding with approval 
and attention (this would specially apply to mentoring programs where the mentor is assigned 
to work with several mentorees at the same time).  Dishion and colleagues have shown that 
increased exposure to negative peer influences via deviancy training is associated with 
increased substance use, delinquency, and violence (Dishion, et al., 1999; Dishion, et al., 
1996; and Patterson, et al., 2000).  Furthermore, it is possible that interventions serving high-
risk students will generate a greater deviancy training effect as the population is more likely 
to actively model and encourage deviance. Indeed, research suggests that grouping high-risk 
youths together for intervention services can increase subsequent delinquency (Cho, et al., 
2005; and Dishion, et al., 1999). 
Finally, Rhodes, 2002, speculates about the possibility of unintentional negative effects of 
mentoring, particularly in cases where mentoring relationships are disrupted or terminated.  
In his rigorous experimental evaluation, Karcher, 2008, found negative effects of school-
based mentoring on cooperation of high-school-aged boys that is consistent with this 
possibility. 
 
III.  Human Capital Theory 
A.  Theoretical Motivation  
The lack of academic preparation or poor study skills represents a major challenge for many 
teenagers’ academic success and high-school completion.  To improve their school 
performance and prevent them from dropping out of high-school, there are many academic 
support services offered to low-achieving at-risk youth based on the premise that augmenting 
instruction time ought to increase the students’ cognitive skills and help them get back on 
track.
4  Just as in the case for mentoring programs (but for different reasons), the human 
                                                 




capital theory predicts that the younger the individual the stronger the effect of the 
educational program.  This is because younger individuals have a longer time to recoup their 
investment than older ones, for the same level of investment at each age, implying that the 
return to human capital will be higher for the former than the latter (Becker, 1964).   
However, in contrast with the mentoring view, the human capital model predicts a stronger 
effect of an educational program on the higher ability youth.  This is so because human 
capital has a fundamental dynamic complementarity feature that implies that skills acquired 
early on make later learning easier (Heckman, et al., 1998; and Heckman, 2000). 
Whether the effects of academic support services are long-lived will depend on the 
nature of the knowledge acquired.  A priori, the human capital model predicts that the 
learning ought to be long-lived.  However, the improvement in knowledge will be short-lived 
if: (i) the learning is transitory—“declarative knowledge” (facts about the world) are much 
more likely to be quickly and subsequently forgotten than “procedural knowledge” (a 
repertoire of skills, rules and strategies for using declarative knowledge to solve problems); 
(ii) the learning is mechanical—for instance, it mainly involves improvement in test-taking 
techniques; or (iii) there is a Hawthorne effect—i.e., individuals do not learn but it seems like 
it because they improve their test performance due to an increase in effort and attention 
caused by their gratefulness towards the services received.  Alternatively, the acquired 
knowledge may also fade away overtime if there is no continuous reinforcement and the 
learning that occurred gets swamped by the churning that takes place as youth grow older. 
 
B.  Empirical Evidence 
The results in this literature suggest that the earlier the intervention the better—consistent with 
many academics and practitioners’ beliefs that early childhood interventions are preferred 
                                                                                                                                                        




(Heckman, 2000; Currie, 2001; Currie and Thomas, 2001; Krueger and Whitmore, 2001; 
Carneiro and Heckman, 2003, and Cunha, et al., 2006).  Two recent studies evaluating various 
educational services offered to primary school children— Jacob and Lefgren, 2004, and 
Banerjee et al., 2007—, find beneficial longer-term effects, one or two years after the end of the 
program.  Using a regression discontinuity design, Jacob and Lefgren, 2004, examine the causal 
effect of summer school and grade retention on student achievement.  Contrary to conventional 
wisdom and prior research, the authors find that the net effect of attending summer school was 
to substantially increase academic achievement among third graders, but not sixth graders.   
Banerjee et al., 2007, evaluate two randomized evaluations in India.  The first offered basic 
literacy and numeracy skills to students who had reached third and fourth grades without 
mastering them.  The second offered computer-assisted math training to all four-grade children 
two hours per week.  The authors find that the remedial education program increased average 
test scores of all children in the treatment schools, mostly due to large gains experienced by 
children at the bottom of the test-score distribution; and that the computer-assisted learning 
program increased math test scores.  The authors find that, despite fading a bit, the initial gains 
remained significant one year after the end of the program.   
  In contrast with these encouraging findings, James-Burdumy et al., 2008, conduct a 
randomly design evaluation of the after-school program, 21
st Century, offered to elementary 
students.  These authors find that the program: (i) reduced parent-care after school, (ii) increased 
care by other adults after school, (iii) improved feelings of safety after school, (iv) had no impact 
on academic achievement as measured by reading test scores or grades, and (v) led to higher 
levels of negative behavior among the treatment group relative to the control group on multiple 
outcomes, including suspensions, teachers calling students’ parents about behavior, and students 
being disciplined by teachers.  According to the authors possible explanations for these results 




children leading fatigue or negative behavior. 
  The encouraging results from early childhood interventions also contrast with findings from 
service-oriented dropout-prevention programs that are implemented during the high-school 
years.  Dynarski and Gleason, 2002, summarize findings from a large evaluation of United 
States’ federally funded dropout-prevention programs and find that, although intensive 
interventions at middle-school level can keep students in school longer, or even accelerate their 
progress in school, they have no effects on attendance or academic performance.  Moreover, 
when analyzing dropout-prevention programs for students of high-school age, these authors find 
that these programs did not succeed in lowering dropout rates, although they did increase high-
school diplomas instead of GED certificates.  These authors also highlight that these program 
work best when the educational services are combined with mentoring  
  In contrast with these discouraging studies, three recent rigorous studies have found positive 
returns for interventions offering educational services targeted to youth at a relatively late stage 
of schooling (Machin, et al., 2004; and Lavy and Schlosser, 2005; and Rodríguez-Planas, 2010).  
While Machin, et al., 2004; and Lavy and Schlosser, 2005, use a quasi-experimental design, and 
focus on short-term impacts of the educational services offered to high-school students in Israel 
and the United Kingdom, respectively; Rodríguez-Planas, 2010, uses an experimental design to 
evaluate the short-, medium-, and longer-term impacts of the Quantum Opportunity Program, an 
intensive mentoring program offering educational services and financial incentives for 5 years to 
at-risk youth in the United States.  As it was, the average amount of time (708 hours) enrollees 
spent on educational activities during the first four years of the Quantum Opportunity Program 
corresponds to about 72% of an extra school year, a substantial investment of time (in addition 
to the time spent with the mentor).  Machin et al., 2004, evaluate the Excellence in Cities (EiC) 
program, which aims at alleviating poor students’ achievement in inner city areas.   Using a 




attainment and strong reduction in absences within EiC schools relative to schools in the 
comparison group.  Using the same methodology, Lavy and Schlosser, 2005, study the effect of 
targeted remedial education on underperforming teenagers in Israel, and find that it increased the 
probability of earning a matriculation certificate, but had no effects on achievement (although 
they did find that program participants gained on average two additional credits without 
lowering their average score).  While Rodríguez-Planas, 2010, finds similar short-term hefty 
beneficial average impacts on high-school graduation and post-secondary education enrollment, 
she finds that these encouraging results quickly faded away as some control group members 
eventually caught up to the treatment group.  Moreover, heterogeneity mattered as the program 
fared significantly better in multiple dimensions for its female than its male enrollees.
5 
  Finally, results from evaluations on post-secondary academic support services are 
mixed.  On the one hand, Bettinger and Long, 2009, and Scrivener et al., 2008, found 
academic performance improvements of remediation programs; on the other, Angrist et al., 
2009, found that academic support services worked for college freshmen women in Canada 
only when combined with peer advising and financial services are combined.  Using variation 
in remedial placement policies across institutions and the importance of proximity in college 
choice and data from 28,000 students, Bettinger and Long, 2009, examine the effects of math 
and English remediation on college students from Ohio.   Their findings suggest that students 
in remediation are more likely to persist in college in comparison to students with similar test 
scores and backgrounds who were not required to take the courses. They are also more likely 
to transfer to a higher-level college and to complete a bachelor's degree.  Using an 
randomized experiment design, Scrivener et al., 2008, analyze the effects of learning 
communities, which placed college freshmen in groups of up to 25 who took three classes 
                                                 
5 Using quasi-experimental methods, Pema and Mehay, 2009, study the impact of the Junior Reserve Officers’ 
Training Corps (JROTC), a program that combines classroom instruction, with more broad extra-curriculum 
activities—such as physical education, military drill and customs, community service activities, and summer 




together during their first semester and provided enhanced counseling and tutoring as well as 
a voucher for textbooks.  Two years after implementation, the authors find promising 
cognitive and non-cognitive results.  For instance, they find treated students attempted and 
passed more courses and earned more credits during their first semester (although, these 
effects diminished in subsequent semesters).  Moreover, they find that the program moved 
students more quickly through developmental English requirements, and that students in the 
program group felt more integrated and more engaged than students in the control group.  
Angrist et al., 2009, is the only study that evaluates three types of treatment (one involving 
financial rewards, another one involving educational services, and the third one combining 
the other two) on grades and academic standing of college students in Canada using an 
experimental design, and they find no effects of educational services when implemented 
alone.  However, these authors did find long-lasting beneficial effects on academic 
achievement for women when the educational services were combined both with mentoring 
and financial awards based on grades—of $5,000 in cash, almost exactly the same as a year’s 
tuition, for a grade average of B (a GPA of 3.0) or higher, or $1,000 in cash for a C+ or B- (a 
GPA of 2.3 to 2.9). 
 
IV. Financial Incentives Awards 
A.  Theoretical Motivation  
Students may exert suboptimal study effort if they overly discount the future (Greene, 1986; 
Nurmi, 1991, Gruber, 2001), if they have time inconsistent preferences, such as hyperbolic 
discounting (Green et al., 1994; Kirby, 1997; Laibson, 1997, Bettinger and Slonim, 2007), or if 
they perceive overly high education costs or overly low expected returns (Eckstein and Wolpin, 
1999).  In such cases, standard economic models predict that financial incentives ought to 




performance is positively related with effort (Smith and Walkers, 1993; Gibbons, 1997; and 
Lazear, 2000).  Similarly, behaviorist psychology also predicts that rewards improve 
performance, albeit for different reasons, namely financial reward offered for an unpleasant 
activity will reduce the aversion towards that activity, leading to long-run positive effects on 
performance (Skinner, 1953).  According to these theories, the effects of financial rewards ought 
to be long-lived, especially if they create a studying habit behavior, if they reduce distaste for 
studying, or if they increase human capital (and therefore lower the subsequent education costs).
  
  However, the positive effect of financial rewards on behavior has been seriously questioned 
both in economics and psychology.  The economists’ argument is that this prediction may fail 
because factors other than money and effort may enter into the decision of the agent.  Such 
factors include the signaling consequences of accepting very small compensations for a task, 
social norms that prescribe a behavior independently of financial rewards, or reciprocity, among 
others (see Titmuss, 1970, and 1971; Frey, 1994; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Kohn, 1993, 
and Benabou and Tirole, 2003, among others).  The cognitive psychology school also 
challenged the conclusion of behaviorist psychologists by arguing that financial rewards may 
replace powerful and enduring “intrinsic motivation” (the individual’s desire to perform the task 
for its own sake) with short-lived “extrinsic motivation” that ultimately reduces effort and 
achievement (Kruglansky et al., 1973; Deci et al., 1973; Lepper and Greene, 1978; and Kohn, 
1999).  If so, we may observe that there are detrimental or no short-term effects of the financial 
rewards or that the initial positive effects are short-lived and quickly fade away.  As in the 
standard economic theory models and the behaviorists’ psychology school, these theories predict 
that the cognitive skills of individuals (educational background, and general intelligence) may 
interact with incentives leading to better outcomes for better endowed (in terms of human 
capital, or ability) students (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).  However, in contrast with the earlier 




reinforcers in the short term may have hidden costs, in that they become negative reinforcers 
once they are withdrawn. 
 
B.  Empirical Evidence 
Experimental and Field Laboratory Evidence 
While experimental psychology research supported the idea that reward-based incentives lead to 
increased effort in students (Holland and Skinner, 1961), a substantial body of experimental and 
field laboratory evidence conducted in the 1970s and later indicates that extrinsic motivation 
(contingent rewards) can sometimes conflict with intrinsic motivation (the individual’s desire to 
perform the task for its own sake).  For instance, Deci, 1975, found that those college students, 
who were not paid to work for a certain time on an interesting puzzle, played with the puzzle 
significantly more in a later unrewarded “free-time” period and reported a greater interest in the 
task than paid subjects.  This experiment was replicated for high-school students in tasks 
involving verbal skills (Kruglanski, Friedman and Zeevi, 1971), and for preschool children in 
activities involving drawing with new materials (Lepper, Greene and Nisbett, 1973).  More 
recently, Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000, found that students who were collecting donations door-
to-door actually visited fewer houses and collected less money when they were paid a small 
commission.  Other experiments finding that people who were not paid at all exerted greater 
effort than those who were paid a small amount include Wilson, Hull and Johnson, 1981; Kohn, 
1993; Frey and Jegen, 2000; and Heyman and Ariely, 2004, among others.  More recently, 
laboratory research attempting to quantify the effect of external factors on intrinsic motivation 
has yielded mixed conclusions: Cameron et al., 2001, conducted meta-studies of over 100 
experiments and found that the negative effects of external rewards were limited and could be 
overcome in certain settings – such as for high-interest tasks – but in a similar meta-study Deci 






Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Evaluations 
Despite this substantial laboratory and field experimental evidence, demonstrations offering 
students cash incentives are becoming popular among policy makers, practitioners and 
researchers, and they are being offered both in primary and secondary education in many 
countries.  For instance, three high-schools are offering such types of incentives in Créteil, a 
suburb of Paris, France (El País, 2009).  In the United States, the Education Innovation 
Laboratory at Harvard has implemented four evaluations offering financial rewards with the 
objective of improving academic performance of youth, such as Capital Gains in Washington 
DC, Spark and Million Motivation Campaign in New York, and The Paper Project in 
Chicago (Fryer, 2010).  Other interventions involving incentive programs in primary and 
secondary education are also taking place in the Baltimore City Public School District (Ash, 
2008); and in Texas (Jackson, 2007).  Finally, other related international examples include 
Progresa in Mexico (Behrman et al., 2000; and Schultz, 2004), Familias en Acción program 
in Colombia (Attanasio et al., 2006), the Education Maintenance Allowance in the United 
Kingdom (Dearden, et al., 2005), a merit award program for girls in Kenya (Kremer et al., 
2008), or cash incentives to low-performing schools in Israel for increasing their high-school 
matriculation certification rate (Angrist and Lavy, 2009) 
There are two types of financial incentives offered to students: those on inputs and those 
on outputs.  Incentives on outputs are more common in the student incentives literature.  In 
most studies on student incentives the objective is to pass a test and students are paid if they 
complete the objective.  As Fryer, 2010, explains, under certain assumptions, traditional price 
theory predicts that providing incentives based on output is socially optimal because each 
student decides which input from their production function to subsidize.  Assuming that 
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students have superior knowledge about how they learn, it is socially optimal to allow them 
to allocate their time across inputs.  However, if this assumption is violated, then it can be 
more effective to provide incentives for inputs.   
The evidence on financial incentives is still mixed.  Two recent studies on financial 
incentives on outputs have found encouraging results.  Kremer et al., 2008, report results 
from a randomized evaluation of a merit scholarship program in Kenya in which girls who 
scored well on academic exams at the end of 6
th grade had their school fees paid and received 
a cash grant for school supplies over the next two years. In the sample as a whole, girls 
eligible for the scholarship showed substantial gains in academic exam scores, and teacher 
attendance also improved significantly in program schools. There was also evidence of 
positive externalities: girls with low pre-test scores, who were unlikely to win, showed test 
score gains in program schools.  Angrist and Lavy, 2009, used a school-based randomization 
design targeted to low-performing schools offering cash incentives to all who passed their 
high-school matriculation certificate (Bagrut) in Israely treated schools.  The experiment led 
to a substantial increase in certification rates for girls with high predicted Bagrut rates 
relative to other girls in the sample, that is, girls with a relatively high ex-ante chance of 
certification.
7  However, they do not find any effect on boys, nor girls who were not as close 
to passing anyways.  The authors also find beneficial lasting effects on college attendance 
among girls who were relatively close to success 5 years after the end of the program.  
In contrast, Fryer, 2010, measures the effect of four different financial incentives on 
student achievement: two of them are “output” experiments (the ones in Chicago and New 
York city) and the other two (in Dallas and in Washington, DC) are “input” experiments, and 
only finds encouraging results for cash incentives on certain inputs.  Indeed, he finds that 
incentives for output did not increase achievement, while incentives for certain inputs did 
                                                 




(such as incentives for reading book, but they worked for certain groups only).  He explains 
that the leading theory behind these findings is that students do not understand the 
educational production function and, thus, lack the know-how to translate their excitement 
about the incentive structure into measurable output.
8 
While some studies using a quasi-experimental approach find beneficial effects of 
financial rewards on academic performance (Ashworth et al., 2001; Dearden, et al., 2005; 
and Dynarski, 2003 and 2008), others find that scholarships lead students to get better grades 
but to take less ambitious course loads (Binder, et al., 2002; Cornwell et al., 2005; Cornwell 
et al., 2006). Similarly, Angrist et al., 2002, and Angrist et al., 2006, have also found that 
vouchers for private secondary school students conditional on their maintaining a satisfactory 
level of academic performance led to academic gains, one possible channel being the 
incentives associated with conditional renewal of scholarships.  Using a regression 
discontinuity design, Garibaldi et al., 2007, find that gradually increasing tuition payments in 
response to delayed completion had substantial effects on Italian college women. 
Two recent randomly designed studies have found that incentives work for women when 
combined with other services.  As explained earlier, Angrist et al., 2009, find lasting 
improvements on grades and academic standing for college freshmen women in Canada only 
when educational services, peer advising and financial services are combined.  Similarly, the 
Quantum Opportunity Program, which analyzes the effects of combining financial incentives 
(both on inputs and outputs) with mentoring and educational services, also finds that there 
were important gender differential effects of the program (Rodríguez-Planas, 2010).  The 
financial incentives in this program had two components: an incentive on inputs and another 
                                                 
8 A related literature to financial incentives on outputs includes numerous studies examining the impact of 
various types of tuition and financial aid policies on college-going show that students respond to changes in 
college cost (Leslie and Brinkman, 1988; Cornwell, Mustard, Cameron and Heckman, 1993; and Kane, 1998; 
Dynarski, 2003; and Deming and Dynarski, 2009).  A consensus estimate associates a $1,000 change in college 
costs with an approximately 5 percentage point difference in college enrollment rates.  Moreover, according to a 




one on outputs.  First, youth received a stipend of $1.25 for every hour devoted explicitly to 
educational activities, developmental activities (excluding recreational activities), and 
community service.  Second, a matching amount was promised to the youth when he or she 
earned a high school diploma or GED and enrolled in post-secondary education or training 
(including vocational training or military service).
9  This was clearly an incentive on output 
as the student received the economic incentive only if they graduated from high-school and 
enrolled in post-secondary education.  By the end of the demonstration, this represented for 
most youths receiving between $1,000 to $3,000 after high-school graduation and enrollment 
in post-secondary education, a far from negligible amount.  The size of this incentive is 
comparable to the ones currently being offered in ongoing evaluations, such as, Capital 
Gains, where the average student will earn $750 per year; Spark, where 7
th graders can earn 
up to $500 per year; or The Paper Project, where the average student will earn $800 per year 
(up to a maximum of $2,000 per year).  The program helped female students get them 
through high-school and post-secondary training (not necessarily college) quicker than their 
counterparts in the control group.  Moreover, five years after the end of the program, female 
enrollees had better employment outcomes than control group members.  In contrast, the 
program had some adverse short-term impacts on male students’ academic performance and 
substance abuse, while leaving their rate of high-school graduation unaffected.  Moreover, 
males showed worse adult employment outcomes and higher involvement on adult criminal 
activity than members of the control group.  Unfortunately, the program was not designed to 
test for alternative channels, and thus, it is unclear which of the three components mattered 
the most for the beneficial results on women. 
While Kremer et al., 2008, did not find evidence for weakened intrinsic motivation or 
gaming, and their effects persisted one year after incentives were removed, they also found 
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evidence of heterogeneity in program effects, suggesting the impact of incentives is context 
dependent.
10  Leuven et al., 2003, is the only real-world context study to find explicit 
evidence consistent with external rewards crowding out intrinsic motivation for the least able 
students both in the short-term and in the longer-run.  They study the impacts of financial 
rewards on academic achievement of college students in Amsterdam and measure its effects 
up to three years after the end of the program.  Unfortunately, their small sample sizes limit 
statistical precision, complicating inference. Leuven et al., 2003, find positive (negative) long 
lasting effects on academic achievement for the academically strong (weak) students.   
 
V.  Sex Matters 
As is frequently found in the literature, results frequently differ by sex.  Explanations for this 
differential impact include the fact that young women may have more self-discipline 
(Duckworth and Seligman, 2006), may be more likely to delay gratification (Silverman, 2003), 
or may have lower discount rates than young men (Warner and Pleeter, 2001).  In this section 
we summarize the interventions in which gender differences in response to services and 
incentives have been observed.
11  
  As discussed in the earlier section, the Quantum Opportunity Program worked remarkably 
for females but did quite poorly for males (Rodríguez-Planas, 2010).  Similarly, Bernstein et al., 
2009, also find heterogeneous effects by gender in their experimental evaluation of the Student 
Mentoring Program.  In particular, they find that the impacts on girls were statistically 
significantly different from impacts on boys for two self-reported scales: Scholastic Efficacy and 
School Bonding, which measured academic performance; and Pro-social Behaviors, which 
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boys, and student school attendance increased in program schools. In the other district, attrition complicated 
estimation, but they could not reject the hypothesis that there were no program effect. 
11 To our knowledge, the only exception is Fryer, 2010, who has recently found that in an intervention involving 





measured non-cognitive skills, such as interpersonal relationships, personal responsibility, and 
community involvement.  For boys, the impact on Pro-social Behaviors was negative and 
statistically significant (that is, treatment group boys had lower Pro-social Behaviors scores than 
those in the control group).  For girls, the impact on Scholastic Efficacy and School Bonding 
was positive and statistically significant.  
  In terms of educational services, Anderson, 2008, shows that three well-known early 
childhood interventions (Abecedarian, Perry, and the Early Training Project) had substantial 
short- and long-term effects on girls but no effect on boys.  Similarly, a number of public-sector 
training programs generated larger effects on women than men (Robert J. Lalonde, 1995). A 
related intervention, which allowed access to better communities (and schools), the Moving to 
Opportunity randomized evaluation of housing vouchers, likewise generated clear benefits for 
girls, with little or even adverse effects on boys (Jeffrey R. Kling, Jeffrey B. Leibman, and 
Lawrence F. Katz, 2007).   
  Within the literature on financial incentives, Dynarski, 2008, estimates larger effects of 
tuition aid on college completion for women in the United States, while Garibaldi et al., 2007, 
find that tuition affects the completion rates of women more than men in Italy.  As mentioned 
earlier, in the study of the effects of merit awards on Israeli high-school students, Angrist and 
Lavy, 2010, find effects on girls only.  Similarly, the randomized trial looking at cash payments 
for academic achievement among college freshman in Canada finds clear effects for females but 
no effect on males (Angrist et al., 2009).  A more modest but still marked gender differential 
crops up in the response to randomly assigned vouchers for private secondary schools in 
Colombia (Angrist, et al., 2002).  
 




VI. Where to Go Next? 
While most of these studies analyze the effects of the interventions during or shortly after the 
students have been exposed to the program, the evidence on the medium- or longer-term impacts 
is very scarce.  In addition, and probably because of the shorter-term focus, all of these studies 
look at educational outcomes as opposed to adult employment outcomes and wages.  Indeed  
very few papers have a broader, multi-angle focus of the effects of the program on youths’ lives, 
including college completion, employment outcomes, earnings, risky behaviors, and other 
measures of family life and physical and mental well-being.  However, knowing the long-term 
impacts of these interventions is key to disentangle the following questions:  Do the short-term 
changes generated by the intervention persist or do they quickly fade away?  Do they translate 
into longer-term payoffs as measured by post-secondary schooling, employment, and earnings?  
Do they provide a better understanding of the observed gender differences in response to 
educational services and incentives? 
   As a consequence measuring impacts at different points in time that include a broad 
scope of life outcomes (including non-cognitive skills) arises as an increasingly main priority.  
Moreover, observing impacts over time will enable us to better understand the mechanisms 
through which different components of the program work.  While follow-up survey data is 
extremely expensive, administrative long-term data ought to be cheaper, easier to access and 
with fewer measurement and response problems (although also more limited in the range of 
outcome information available). 
  Second, this paper highlights that heterogeneity matters and that evaluations ought to be 
designed such that sample sizes are large enough to identify for whom the program works, as 
this has important implication for future policy targeting.  In particular, the underlying factors 
responsible for the observed gender differences in response to services and incentives constitute 




broadly observed gender differences in the labor market, where a gender gap persist both in 
wages and in prospects for advancement (Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn, 2000).  
There is a need for further studies using experimental designs to answer whether and how 
services and cash incentives work differently across genders.  There is also a need to reconcile 
these findings with those on laboratory and field experiments on gender differences in risk, 
social and competition preferences (Croson and Gneezy, 2009).  A possible future development 
is to use the population from the field evaluations to conduct laboratory experiments (as they 
may behave quite differently than the most commonly used agents for laboratory experiments: 
college students). 
 While  heterogeneity  analysis  combined with economic theory and institutional knowledge 
may help disentangle the mechanisms through which programs work, to truly identify channels, 
evaluations ought to be designed to test alternative mechanisms across different groups so that 
knowledge on what works for whom and why is improved, as is currently and increasingly done 
in evaluations in developing countries (Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer, 2009; Abhijit Banerjee, 
Rukmini Banerji, Esther Duflo, and Stuti Khemani, 2008; Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson, 2009, 
among others). To the best of my knowledge, Angrist et al., 2009, are the only ones to analyze 
an experimental evaluation designed to improve academic performance assigning separate types 
of services to different treatment groups.  
  Fourth, in addition to having internal validity, it is important that evaluations also have 
external validity.  The question that ought to be a priority when designing such interventions and 
their evaluation is what would happen if the program were implemented broadly among the 
(targeted) population—be it at-risk youths, academically low-performing children, minorities, 
etc.  Too frequently the interventions are implemented among individuals who have expressed 
an interest in participating into the particular program, potentially leading to creaming-up effects 




Program is quite unique in its design as the eligible population were low-performing children 
from schools with high drop-out rates (regardless of whether they wanted to participate in this 
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